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During the night of 5-6 Sept, an attempt was made to cross the Moselle by the 317th at Pont a Mousson, which was heavily contested by enemy fire from Mousson Hill, on the eastern side. The Germans had blown up the bridge earlier, and the river was approximately 150-200 yards wide in this area. Elements of the 3rd Bn managed to cross in small boats, but, owing to the lack of armored and artillery support as a result of the gasoline shortage, were forced back under heavy German artillery and mortar fire. Many of the men were cut off, and taken prisoner. Confined in a large barn, the building shortly afterward became a target of U.S. artillery fire, increasing the casualties already incurred among the prisoners. Survivors have estimated as many as 35 men were lost in the shelling. Frank Florence, Angelo Barone, Ray Dumrauf, Domenic Palombaro, Leroy Pierce, Phil Piergrossi, Bill Cyrana, and Rex Kibbe were among those who, responding to surprisingly good medical care of their wounds by their captors, spent the next several months as POW's. Ray Dumrauf escaped the carnage in the barn, but lay severely wounded and barely conscious in the open for several hours before he was found and taken prisoner. Ray remembered mumbling, "meine Mutter..." to the German soldier who stood over him with his bayoneted rifle demanding his wristwatch. The somewhat surprised German nodded, and Ray kept the watch. Domenic recalled a shell landing between him and another GI as they and their German guards were fleeing the barn that left the other man uninjured, but threw a piece of shrapnel at him that cut all of his belts completely through and slashed his side. Two steps later Dom fell to the ground, tripped up by his pants as they fell around his knees, but the shell fragment had sutured his wound. The 317th lost a total of 294 men here in killed, wounded, and missing. George Crofoot was one of the luckier ones who, although wounded by a mortar round was assisted into one of the boats they had crossed in and made it back to the other side.

Concerned beforehand about the lack of preparation, particularly artillery support, Colonel Cameron, commanding the 317th, had objected to making the crossing.  Patton ordered that he be relieved of command and sent home despite the validity of his concern.  The 319th meanwhile had effected a crossing of the river to the southeast at Toul, but crossed into a strongly defended salient formed by a loop in the river east of the Foret de Haye, and was held in place by the German 3rd Parachute regiment until 10 September. A salient is a protrusion, or bulge, in a line, and becomes a liability to the defenders as it exposes them on three sides with the added risk of being cut off in the rear.  The Germans had made good use of the respite they had gained by Patton’s supply problems. By the time the attacks of 5 September were launched they had succeeded in reinforcing to nearly the equivalent numerical strength of the 3rd Army facing them - four infantry and two armored divisions (only half the 3rd Army strength of twelve divisions as of 1 August, the remainder having been reassigned to the 1st and 9th Armies in the interim). Under the control of Army Group B (Gen. Model, reporting to von Runstedt and, much to their detriment, everyone under the direct control of Adolph Hitler) a total of eight divisions had been assembled in the 3rd Army front; the 17th SS Panzergrenadier (Ostendorff), 559th Volksgrenadier (Muehten), 48th Infantry (Casper) and Division 462 (Krause) in Preiss’ XIII SS Corps opposing Walker’s XX Corps, and the 3rd (Hecker) and 15th (Rodt) and 553 Volksgrenadier in von Luettwitz’s XLVII Panzer Corps opposing Eddy’s XII Corps, with the 106th Panzer Brigade in reserve and fragments of numerous smaller units mixed in everywhere. These units were not at full strength (nor were those of the US 3rd Army, particularly in the rifle companies that averaged about 10% under strength at that point), and VG divisions were approximately 2/3 the size of regular army divisions, having only two battalions to a regiment. Additionally, by the 8th, the 16th Division, a component of Army Group G, had moved into position on the extreme left. Many headquarters units had survived the August retreat intact to provide a nucleus for the regrouping, and German supply lines were shortening while Patton’s were being stretched to their limits.

Patton launched his attack as though he was still in pursuit of a beaten enemy retreating in disarray. All indications are that he knew better - available intelligence and Ultra intercepts - but could not accept that he was facing something more than a thin defensive force. Fixed on the idea that the German forces opposing him were so reduced in strength that, being forced to defend along the entire line, they would collapse everywhere in the face of his attack, giving him a clear field in their rear for a rapid advance to the Rhine upon which he was focused. Traditional military theory requires that an attacking force requires a 3:1 superiority against a prepared defensive position, which he could only have achieved by concentrating force on selected, preferably weak, points. The “broad front” attack against a dug in enemy of equal strength doomed it to failure.  Although his window of opportunity had been closed during the few days of delay, the German line was still not developed in depth. A concentration of force in a limited sector would likely have achieved the desired breakthrough.  Eddy, with an excess of caution, scheduled another attack for the 11th. Primarily an infantryman, Eddy tended to be conventional and unimaginative in his thinking, and differed with Patton regarding the need for speed. There were some mitigating factors: artillery ammunition was short since, being preoccupied with fuel shortages, none had been requisitioned, although there was none to be had in any case. The additional five days would give the Germans adequate time to address the depth of their defenses. Patton was remiss in not pressing Eddy harder, but it is likely that his confidence had been shaken by the initial failure. In addition, Walker’s XX Corps was becoming bogged down at Metz, removing his strength from the equation, and it became the responsibility of XII Corps to meet Bradley’s ultimatum to secure a bridgehead on the eastern side of the Moselle no later than the 14th.  Raymond Kelso to hospital 6 September 1944.